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"THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN" AND ITS UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES TO INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Charlene C. Goldfield*
Social media has dramatically changed how we interact and
communicate with one another. The reliance on social media has also
sparked many international debates revolving around privacy. We have
seen the enactment of the comprehensive privacy law in the European
Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United States-both
enacted in 2018. In the GDPR, Article 17, known as the "Right to Be
Forgotten" (RTBF) principle, allows.for data subjects to request that their
information be removed from online service providers like social media
companies. In recent years, cases from the Court of Justice for the
European Union have expanded these RTBF principles through three
major cases: Google LLC v. Commission nationale de 'informatique et
des libertes (CNIL), GC v. Commission nationale de 1 'informatiqueet des
libertes (CNIL), and Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook. This Article
argues that the RTBF model will present unintended consequences to
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) by mandating online service
providers to delete more data than necessary based on the pressures
placed on these online service providers by the recent Court of Justice for
the European Union (CJEU) cases. This will lead to problems in the
Intelligence Community when obtaining open source intelligence
especially when scrubbing social media information. This RTBF system
will make it easier for terrorist groups, terrorist sympathizers or any other
associated individuals to hide behind a process by which they can easily
delete data that was not so easily removable before RTBF. Lastly, this
Article proposes legal, procedural, and oversight solutions to address the
issues caused by RTBF and OSINT.
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INTRODUCTION

The use of social networking has increased, dramatically, in the last
few years. As of January 2019, Facebook Messenger documented about
1.3 billion users, meanwhile WhatsApp documented 1.5 billion users.'
With the increased use of social media, more publicly available
information on the internet has assisted with anticipating when future
terrorist attacks might occur and the crucial location sites where they
might take place in order to prevent them. 2 This has made Open Source
Intelligence (OSINT)-information publicly-available for intelligence
purposes-more critical than ever. Eighty percent of information
3
obtained for intelligence mission purposes is "publicly available."
One crucial example is a U.S. military airstrike conducted in 2014
over an Islamic State bomb factory. The U.S. military was able to obtain
the precise location of this factory from a "selfie" photograph of the
4
building posted on one of the jihadi members' social media. There are
several other instances when OSINT has greatly assisted with
counterintelligence operations. With such a dependable reliance on
OSINT, it is important that OSINT is not only supported, but encouraged
within the Intelligence Community (IC).
. The relationship between national security and privacy has always
been marked with tension, especially in the area of intelligence gathering.
This sentiment can be attributed to the rapid transformation of digital
incorporation into society. 5 But the Edward Snowden leaks pushed more

1. Maya E. Dollarhide, Social Media Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 6, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/social-media.asp [https://perma.cc/GZ9G-JDR8].

2. Sofia Charania, Social Media's Potentialin Intelligence Collection, 33 AM. INTELL. J.
94, 96 (2016).
3. Id. at 94.
4. Cameron Colquhoun, A Brief History of Open Source Intelligence, BELLINGCAT (July
14,

2016),

https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/articles/

2

016/07/14/a-brief-history-of-open-

source-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/S58Q-L529}.
5. Julie E. Cohen, Surveillance versus Privacy, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
SURVEILLANCE LAw 455 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017).
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people to feel uncertain about the intelligence community. 6 This
uncertainty was mostly felt in the European Union (EU). Before the
Snowden leaks, discussions on the enactment of a comprehensive privacy
law that would replace Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data (the "Directive") 7 had faded.8
However, in the wake of the Snowden leaks in June of 2013,9 the
European Parliament and Council of the EU enacted the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016 with the specific design to repeal
the previous directive.1 0 The Right to Be Forgotten (RTBF), codified in
the GDPR under Article 17, is rooted in the preservation of privacy
protections by allowing individuals to request a process by which their
data can be deleted from companies that process or control data."
The RTBF principle first arose from the Court of Justice for the
European Union (CJEU) decision in Google Spain SL. v. Agencia
Espanolade Protecci6nde Datos12 (hereinafter referred to as Google v.
Spain). This case mandated that commercial search companies like
Google remove links that led to information on private individuals
following a search made about a private individual's name. 13 Ultimately,
this decision would require search engine platforms to establish RTBF
procedures that would allow individuals to remove data about
themselves.
The CJEU has continued to expand the RTBF theory with three recent
decisions: Google LLC v. Commission nationalede 1 'informatique et des

6. Rachel L. Brand, Balance in Intelligence Gatheringand Privacy, THE HILL (Dec. 15,
2015), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/263143-balance-intelligencegathering-and-privacy.
7. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 1 (EC), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31995L0046 [https://perma.cc/3NL3-8ZK8].
8. See Agustin Rossi, How the Snowden Revelations Saved the EU General Data

ProtectionRegulation, 53 THE INT'L SPECTATOR, no. 4, 2018, at 95, 104 (discussing the political
landscape before the Snowden revelations regarding privatelegislation).
9. Paul Szoldra, This is everything Edward Snowden revealed in one year of
unprecedented top-secret leaks, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.business

insider.com/snowden-leaks-timeline-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/37ME-6N9G] (stating, "In June
2013, The Guardian reported the first leak based on top-secret documents that then 29-year-old
Edward Snowden stole from the National Security Agency.").

10. Regulation 2016/679, art. 94, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A020I6R0679-20160504
[hereinafter GDPR].

[https://perma.cc/GF7S-RC22]

11. Id art. 17.
12. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317

(May

13, 2014) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ENfXT/?uri=

CELEX%3A62012CJ0131 [https://perma.cc/X5MT-JK25] [hereinafter Google v. Spain].
13. Id. ¶ 100(3).
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libertes (CNIL),' 4 GC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des
libertis (CNIL)1 5 (as these are two separate decisions involving Google
and CNIL, these two decisions will hereinafter be referred to as Google I
and Google II respectively), and Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook
IrelandLtd. (hereinafter referred to as the Facebookcase).1 6 In Google I,
the CJEU determined that injunctions requiring internet service platforms
to take down personal information of European citizens did not apply
globally.' 7 While this decision seemed like a win for internet platform
companies, in reality, the CJEU left open the possibility for EU member
states to legislate a global takedown requirement.1 8 As for Google II, the
Court created a notice-and-delist regime for sensitive data and
19
determined certain actions to take on content display by search engines.
In the Facebook case, the Court determined that social media sites are
subject to RTBF regulations and that delisting obligations can be
mandated globally. 2 0
A point that can be obtained from the RTBF cases is that personal data
is an extension of the individual-a blurred line between the kinetic and
digital world. While it is understandable that the EU and its courts would
strongly support RTBF, there is an unintended consequence that RTBF
will cause if it is not properly addressed-a predicament that occurs when
courts are utilized to create policy. The RTBF system will pose problems
for OSINT by mandating data providers to delete more data than
necessary according to the pressures placed on them by the recent CJEU
cases. This will lead to problems in the Intelligence Community when
conducting OSINT efforts, especially when scrubbing social media
information. This RTBF system will make it easier for terrorist groups,
terrorist sympathizers or any other associated individuals to hide behind
a process by which they can easily delete data that was not so easily
removable before RTBF. 2 1

14. Case C-507/17, Google LLC, successor in law to Google Inc. v. Commission nationale
de

l'informatique et des libertds, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Google I].

15. Case C-136/17, GC v. Commission nationale de t'informatique et des libert6s,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:14 (Jan. 10, 2019), https://eur-lex.europa.eulegal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=
CELEX:62017CC0136 [https://perma cc/E4WS-NYG2] [hereinafter Google II].
16. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821
(Oct. 3, 2019), https://eur-lex.europa.eulegal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62017CJ0507
[https://permacc/XNH4-GZ6C] [hereinafter Facebook].
17. Google I, supra note 14, 164.
18. Id. ¶ 72.
19. Google II, supra note 15, ¶¶ 62-66.
20. Facebook, supra note 16, ¶¶ 37, 41, 50.
21. See Lexie N. Johnson, Ctrl + Shift + Delete: The GDPR's Influence on National
Security Posture, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.: NET POL. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/blog/
gdpr-influence-national-security-posture

[https://perma.cc/T6HE-M925]

(arguing

that data

collection efforts will be complicated by the "right to be forgotten" principle under GDPR).
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This Article proposes three legal, procedural, and oversight solutions
to mend the issues caused by RTBF and OSINT. An oversight model
would assist with the processing side of RTBF claims made by
individuals. By creating a data monitoring committee, similar to the
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), 22 the ultimate
decision to de-list or delete content would not rest solely in the hands of
a data processor or Data Protection Authority (DPA). To address
international differences in privacy standards and intelligence gathering,
EU member states and the U.S. could follow a cooperation model solely
concentrated on intelligence gathering, similar to the CLOUD Act model
entered into between the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom
(U.K.). 23 If no agreement is entered into with specific EU member states,
then no intelligence gathering information can be obtained or received on
that specific member states' person. Lastly, RTBF would not be
applicable to an EU member state if there is a national security exemption
as dictated by Article 23 of the GDPR. 24 As it stands, the national security.
exemption is not well defined, and it is unclear when it can be exercised..
With only two years of GDPR enforcement, there has not been much
precedent on how and when these exceptions can come into effect. These
proposed solutions could assist in resolving the unintended consequence
between OSINT and RTBF.

I. DISCUSSIONS ON GDPR, RTBF AND OSINT
A. The GDPR Process and its ExtraterritorialReach
The right to privacy first began to make headway into international
law, through the enactment of Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948, which briefly noted that an individual should not
be "subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy."2 5 Then, in 1950,
the European Convention of Human Rights enacted Article 8, which
noted "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family
life .. ." and continued, "[t]here shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right. ... "26 Lastly, in 1966, Article 17
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provided that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
22. Membership,

GLOB.

INTERNET

F. TO

COUNTER

TERRORISM,

https://gifct.org/

membership/ [https://perma.cc/6F4E-8PSX].
23. U.S. And UK Sign Landmark Cross-Border Data Access Agreement to Combat
Criminals and Terrorists Online, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/us-and-uk-sign-Iandmark-cross-border-data-access-agreement-combat-criminals-andterrorists [https://perma.cc/R2LJ-XXFG] [hereinafter U.S. and U.K. Agreement].
24. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 23.

25. G.A. Res. 217 (Ill) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948).
26. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Sept.

3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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privacy .. .. "27 These provisions have been considered to be "broad and
vague," 28 however, it was not until 2013 that the United Nations passed
a resolution specifically addressing the right to privacy in the digital
age. 29
As a result of Edward Snowden's shocking release of highly classified
information obtained by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), the
U.N. was pressed to address this issue. 30 The treatment of privacy
between the EU and U.S. is vastly different. The EU categorizes privacy
into data protection and private life. 3 1 The EU approach to regulating
privacy is "comprehensive" and "overarching"; 3 2 this is why the GDPR
has been seen as the next best thing for data protection in the EU-it
applies broadly and brings together all EU member states. In contrast, the
U.S. defines privacy broadly and is regulated more sectoral. 33 These
differences are important to consider because data is borderless and fluid,
and cooperation among nation states is extremely important.
Within the EU context, before the GDPR, the Directive was adopted
and allowed for EU member states to enact their own data protection
legislation, while serving as an overarching guide. 34 The Directive
created gaps in the law and introduced problems with enforcement among
the EU member states.3 5 The GDPR was enacted to address all these
issues and strengthen data protection among the EU member states. 36
While the GDPR is expansive, it allows member states to enact their own
derogations or supplemental legislation that pertain to certain national
needs, which includes national security. 37 These derogations are
acceptable, so long as it "respects the essence of fundamental rights and
freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic

27. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17
(Dec. 16, 1966).
28. Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the
DigitalAge, 56 HARV. INT'L L. J. 81, 83 (2015).

29. G.A. Res. 68/167, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, at 2 (Dec. 18, 2013).
30. United Nations Recognition of Privacy, PRIV. INT'L (May 2, 2018), https://privacy
international.org/impact/united-nations-recognition-privacy [https://perma.cc/2YPD-AY22].
31. H. Jacqueline Brehmer, Data Localization: The UnintendedConsequences of Privacy
Litigation, 67 AM. UNIv. L. REV. 927, 934 (2018).

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data ProtectionRegulation:

What Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMMC'N. TECH. L. 65, 70-71 (2019).
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id.
37. Ali Cooper-Ponte, GDPR Derogations, ePrivacy, and the Evolving EuropeanPrivacy
Landscape, LAWFARE (May 25, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/gdpr-derogations

-eprivacy-and-evolving-european-privacy-landscape [https://perma.cc/PT6T-3GSH].
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society." 38 Even the RTBF provision of the GDPR has its own derogation
applicability within Article 17.39
GDPR applies broadly to personal data-defined as any "information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person." 40 An identifiable
natural person, known as the data subject, is "one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly." 4 1 This means that it is not just personal identifiable
information (PII) that must be protected. 42 Sensitive data, such as racial
or ethnic origin, political opinion, biometrics or medical information etc.,
are all denoted under the "special categories" of data described in Article
9 of the GDPR. 43 Once personal data is processed, then GDPR
requirements will be applicable.44 Processing of data is performed by a
data controller or processor and is broadly defined as follows:
any operation or set of operations which is performed on
personal or sets of personal data, whether or not by
automated means,
such as collection, recording,
organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration,
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.4 5
Data is only allowed to be processed if it meets at least one of six
justifications under Article 6, which include consent by the data subject;
legal obligation requires it; or there exists a legitimate interest. 46 One
thing to note is that the "legitimate interest" justification does not
necessarily apply as a blanket approval for online service providers. 4 7 The
recent RTBF cases did not allow for a blanket approval to utilize this
catch-all provision for avoiding the limitations to processing data. 48
Sensitive data is defined separately from personal data and several strict
exceptions apply to its processing, including explicit consent of the data
subject or the information has been manifestly made public by the data

38. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 23(1).

39. Id. art. 17(3)(a).
40. Id. art. 4(1).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.; Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 72.
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 72.
GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 9(1).
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 72.
GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 4(2).

46. Id. art. 6(1)(a), (c), and (f).
47. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 81 (noting that a legitimate interest must be
"explicitly disclosed").
48. See Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe's IntermediaryLiability Laws and the EU
2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 297, 322 (2018) (explaining
how this "concept is a slim reed upon which to rest the entire edifice of OSP operations.").
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subject themselves. 4 9 Regardless, the GDPR is applicable whether the
data is public or private.
The GDPR assigns distinctions between individuals involved in the
processing of personal and sensitive data, which affords them with
varying legal obligations. Data controllers are the "entities that hold
personal data and decide what to do with it," while data processors hold
the personal data, waiting for instructions from the controller on what to
do with the data.5 1 Controllers have more responsibility, and so they have
more legal obligations than processors.5 2 The role of controller and
processor provides a more fluid relationship between traditional
companies that incorporate data as part of their business model, however,
for platforms like Twitter, Facebook and Google, it dictates a more
complex relationship.5 3 Not only do these providers generate back-end
user generated data like profiles, logs and user behavior, they also process
content created and shared by users. 54 This dual relationship can prove to
be difficult to regulate under a traditional data protection model like
RTBF. Applying such a broad categorization to popular online platforms
prove that the GDPR and RTBF principles were not meant to be applied
broadly without understanding the consequences it could present. The
most significant aspect of the GDPR is the hefty fine of up to £20,000,000
plus other administrative fines if data controllers or processors do not
abide by these regulations. 5
The GDPR applies extraterritorially under Article 3, which considers
the establishment or the targeting involved.56 There are three
requirements under the establishment criteria, which are: (1) there must
be some establishment of a controller or processor existing in the EU; (2)
there must be the "existence of processing in the context of the activities
of such establishment"; and (3) the understanding that neither the location

49. GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 9(2)(a) and (e). Sensitive data consists of racial or ethnic
data; political opinions; religious or philosophical beliefs; or trade union memberships or
biometric data. Id. art. 9(1).
50. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 73.
51. Keller, supra note 48, at 307.
52. Id The distinction between controller and processor is important because compliance
rests on the controller and the application of national law for purposes of data processing will be
determined by where the controller is located. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion
1/2010 on the Concepts of "Controller"and "Processor",00264/10/EN WP 169, at 5 (adopted
Feb. 16, 2010), https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/

files/2010/wp169_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FHE6-URBB].
53. See generally Keller, supra note 48, at 308.

54. Id at 308.
55. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 83.
56. Id at art. 3; Lydia F. de la Torre, TerritorialScope ofEU Data ProtectionLaw, MEDIUM
(Nov. 24, 2018), https://medium.com/golden-data/territorial-scope-of-eu-data-protection-law-

d46c13eba23b [https://perma.cc/2T77-3HJT].
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of the processing nor the location of the data subject are relevant. 57 If no
establishment exists, GDPR still applies via the targeting criterion which
only requires that the data subject be located in the EU and that the
activities conducted by either controllers or processors offer goods and
services or utilize monitoring as their services. 58
In summary, it does not matter whether the company or its data is not
located in the EU. Additionally, "the absence of an establishment in the
Union does not necessarily mean that a data controller or processor
established in a third country would be excluded from the territorial scope
of EU data protection law." 59 It does not matter whether the data is
located in the U.S. or the data controller or processor is located in the
U.S.; GDPR could still be applicable.
B. The RTBF Process and its Derogation Under National Security
Article 17 spells out the RTBF procedure, which allows for data
subjects "to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal dataconcerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have
the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay" as long as one
of several factors apply. 60 The RTBF procedure is not listed together
under one section of the GDPR. Instead, they are "cobbled together from
various provisions-many of which are ambiguous." 61 A request would
most likely be handled as follows:
1. The online service provider receives the RTBF
request.
2. If requested by the data subject, the data can be
temporarily suspended or "restricted" from public
access.
3. The claim is reviewed for its validity. If it is valid,
then the content is de-listed or erased. If invalid, the
content is placed back into public view.
4. The online service provider informs the requester of
the outcome and communicates the removal request
to other controllers processing the same data.
5. If requested, the online service provider provides the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 3/2018 On The Territorial Scope of the

GDPR 13 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/filel/edpbguidelines_3_2018_
territorial-scope_after_public_consultationen I.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ8G-EN6B]

[hereinafter

EDPB Guidelines].
60. GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 17(1).
61. Keller, supra note 48, at 327.
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contact details or identification information about the
user who posted the removed content.
6. In most circumstances, the online service provider
will not be allowed to tell the accused user that the
content has been delisted or erased and the user has
no opportunity to object.
7. Online service providers could disclose information
about removals, but not individual instances. 62
Although the wording is focused on public information, it does not
63
necessarily mean that it would not apply to back-end and private data.
Focusing on the language in Article 21(1) of the GDPR, it implies that
decisions whether to keep content are to be based on "compelling
legitimate grounds."6M In other words, "[i]t requires controllers to erase
only to the extent that there are 'no overriding legitimate grounds' to
65
continue processing," denoting a very low standard of review.
The RTBF statute denotes that requests must be addressed "without
undue delay," 66 which may impose pressure on controllers and
processors. However, one thing to note is the ability for member states to
67
derogate from these obligations as directed under Article 17(3)(a).
Derogations allow member states to exercise their ability to enact
amended legislation on an aspect of an agreement.
Currently, only France and Germany have derogated from Article
17.68 Austria, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
69
have not exercised any derogation rights on the matter. France's
amended version of RTBF dictates that data controllers must respond or
delete requests within one month of the filed request, and Germany
exempts controllers from the obligation to erase personal data "managed
through non-automatic data processing if it is deemed impossible or it is
62. Id. at 327-28.
63. Id. at 327 ("The steps are generally sensible for back-end data removals, such as
requests to delete accounts, logs, or profiles.").
64. See GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17(1) ("The controller shall no longer process the
personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the
processing which overrides the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject for the
establishment, exercise or deference of legal claims.").

65. Id. at 334.
66. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17(1).

67. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17(3)(a) ("3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent
that processing is necessary: (a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and
information;").
68. A State-by-State Guide to GDPR Member State Derogations,FOCAL PoINT DATA RISK,
[https://perma.cc/N6SLhttps://go.focal-point.com/guide-to-gdpr-member-state-derogations
MCM8] (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).

69. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss2/2
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considered to be of high effort with low interest from data subject to
erase." 70
There is not much explanation as to the statutory construction of
Article 17. In fact, the Article 29 Working Party-set up as an advisory
group for the GDPR 71-did not have much discussion on the RTBF topic
other than its guidelines based on the Google v. Spain decision. 7 2 The
group noted "the ruling [was] specifically addressed to generalist search
engines, but that does not mean that it [could not] be applied to other
intermediaries." 73 However, the Working Party does not provide much
guidance on what is a "necessary and proportionate measure" for which
a legislature can deviate from the GDPR, as proscribed in Article 23, in
the name of "national security." 74
Member states can derogate from these regulations under a national
security need, so long as it "respects the essence of the fundamental rights
and freedoms" as prescribed under Article 23.75 In fact, Recital 16 to the
GDPR reiterates how the GDPR does not apply to activities outside of
EU law, such as those concerning national security activities. 76 But,
Recital 16 is not the only reason why the GDPR does not apply to national
security matters; the Treaty on European Union dictates under Article
70. Id.
71. The Article 29 Working Party was replaced with the European Data Protection Board
as of May 25, 2018. European Comm'n, The Article 29 Working Party Ceased to ExistAs of 25
May 2018 (Nov. 6, 2018), https://ec.europaeu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?itemid-62
9492 [https://perma.cc/8JMR-ZHY6].

72. Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of.
the European Union Judgment on "Google Spain andInc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccionde
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gondlez" C-131/12, 14/EN WP 225, at 5 (adopted Nov. 26,
2014), https://ec.europaeu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=667236 [https://perma

.cc/4SLQ-LJZV] [hereinafter WP Guidelines].
73. Id. at 8.
74. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 23(1)(a); see also Article 29 Working Party, Working

Document on Surveillance of Electronic Communicationsfor Intelligence andNationalSecurity.
Purposes, 14/EN WP 228, at 40, 45, 50 (adopted Dec. 5, 2014), https://ec.europa.eu/justice/
article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp228_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
4RL9-FCX6] [hereinafter WP Surveillance] (noting how the discussions on "necessary and
proportionate" focus on the U.S. intelligence law landscape and how "the rule of law and the
courts require restrictions to fundamental rights to be limited to what is strictly necessary and
proportionate, specific and codified in law.").
75. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 23(1)(a).
76. Recital 16: Not applicable to Activities Regarding National and Common Security,
GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/recital-I6-not-applicable-to-activities-regarding-national-and-commonsecurity/ [https://perma.cc/JWB7-F45H] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter Recital 16];
"Recitals found in the document provide context and greater depth of meaning to the Articles.
Thus, both the Recitals and Articles are inexorably bound and must be taken together in order to
understand the scope, reach, and intention of the GDPR." What Are GDPR Recitals?, RSI
SECURITY (June 20, 2018), https://blog.rsisecurity.com/what-are-gdpr-recitals/ [https://perma.cc

/M78U-PS97].
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4(2) that national security is the sole responsibility of each member state
and EU law cannot legislate on the matter. 7 7
However, the Working Party does agree with the consensus that no
true defiition of national security exists. 78 Treaties seem to differentiate
between terrorism and national security, and case law has been broad on
the issue. 79 Instead, the Working Party has suggested that determining
whether something falls under this exemption cannot be stripped down to
a legal argument. 80 Instead, it should "take account of the political
8
situation at the time the 'choice' is made, as well as the relevant actors."
These national security interpretations are reserved only for EU member
states. When it involves a third party, like the U.S., it becomes even more
unclear.
The national security exemption can be explained into three scenarios:
applying only to EU member states; applying to the EU and U.S. as a
joint security issue or applying to a security issue occurring in the U.S.,
but it involves an individual residing in the EU. The first scenario is selfexplanatory as each EU member state would apply its own national
security law. As to the second scenario, the national security exemption
may not extended to both countries' actions, but the EU member state
would have to demonstrate "why and how the national security interests
82
coincide and thus exclude the application of EU law." When companies
work closely with government agencies on intelligence matters, the
Working Party has advised the following:
[C]ompanies need to be aware that they may be acting in
breach of European law if intelligence services of third
countries gain access to the data of European citizens stored
on their servers or comply with an order to hand over
personal data on a large scale. In that regard, companies may
find themselves in a difficult position in deciding whether
they comply with the order to supply personal data on a large
scale or not: in either case they are likely to be in breach of
European or third country law. Enforcement action against
these companies in particular should not be excluded in
situations where data controllers have willingly and
77. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
-

8 4 2 5 06
O.J. (C 326) 18, https://eur-lex.europaeu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bfl4bf-a3f - ab -b

fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [https://perma.cc/UH5P-34LF].
78. WP Surveillance, supra note 74, at 22.

79. Id. at 22-24.
80. Id. at 24.
81. Id.
82. Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 04/2014 on Surveillance of Electronic
Communications for Intelligence and National Security Purposes, 819/14/EN WP 215, at 7
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion10, 2014),
Apr.
(adopted
recommendation/files/2014/wp215_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ASX-QPYQ].
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knowingly cooperated with intelligence services to give
them access to their data. 83
Since EU case law has not been too clear on what could constitute
national security, 84 the third scenario could be guided by the
extraterritorial trigger of the GDPR and the scant amount of case law.
As has been shown, many questions remain unanswered, such as,
would a showing of an interconnected relationship still apply if another
third country along with the U.S. is involved? Does the joint involvement
involve issues where a third or fourth country might be involved?
Obtaining a comprehensive definition of national security could address
these questions and would help determine if EU member states can
derogate from RTBF provisions as a national security need.
1. The Legal Landscape of RTBF
In the Google v. Spain case, the CJEU did not provide much
instruction when it required Google to honor RTBF requests by.
"remov[ing] data that is inaccurate or 'inadequate, irrelevant or no longer
relevant, or excessive in relation to the purpose of the processing, even if
the information is true or causes no prejudice to the data subject."' 85 This
was an unclear amount of power provided to search engine platforms.
The Google I case focused on the removal of search result links that
were related to an individual's name search. 86 Google removed the links
from the individual's member country interface-France. 87 Google then
instituted a geo-blocking of the individual's information based on the
region.88 The French Commission nationale de l'informatique et des
libertes (CNIL) did not believe Google's actions were enough and so,
83. Id
84. Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95,

¶ 57 (May 4, 2000), http://hudoc.echr

.coe.int/eng?i=001-58586 [https://perma.cc/U3DZ-46NK] (holding that data collected has to be
relevant to national security purpose, and that the law should define "the kind of information that
may be recorded, the categories of people against whom surveillance measures . . . [and] limits
on the age of information held or length of time for which it may be kept."); see WP Surveillance,
supra note 73, at 26 ("The claim that the national security interest of a third country aligns with
an EU Member States' own national security interest should only be accepted if it is properly
justified to the relevant authorities on a case-by-case basis."); see also Theresa Papademetriou,
Foreign Intelligence Gathering Laws: European Union, THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Dec. 2014),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign -intelligence-gathering/european-union.php#_ftnref43
[https://perma.cc/9C3U-CPWS] (explaining that the CJEU has no standing to review legal
challenges to intelligence operations but the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) can
conduct such a review as the ECHR's view is one of a low standard by which the "mere existence
of legislation allowing secret surveillance constitutes an interference with private life .....
85. Keller, supra note 48, at 314; see also, Google v. Spain, supra note 12, ¶¶ 92-94.
86. Google I, supra note 14, 130.

87. Id ¶ 31.
88. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LA W

196

[Vol. 32

they required them to apply a global de-listing. 89 The CJEU determined
that Google was subject to GDPR regulations as an "operator who has
one or more establishments in the territory of the Union in the context of
activities involving the processing of personal data . . . regardless of
90
whether that processing takes place in the Union or not." The CJEU also
created the general rule that the rights of individuals to the RTBF process
would override economic interest of operator and general public access
unless the individual interfaced with the public. 9' This would indicate that
there is a low bar for data subjects and a high bar for internet search
engines when it comes to RTBF procedures.
While Google and freedom of speech advocates rejoiced to the fact
that the CJEU did not apply RTBF requirements extraterritorially, it still
left the door wide open for EU member states to legislate on the issue by
advocating that "EU law does not currently require that the dereferencing granted concern all versions of the search engine in question,
it also does not prohibit such a practice." 92 Even if the EU member states
considered legislation on this issue, they would still need to remember
that RTBF requires a balancing test-the privacy of the individual versus
the interests of the public. 93 Regardless, this one takeaway would allow
for EU member states to exercise their opportunity to enact a global
injunction of information that could incidentally affect intelligence
gathering.
In the Google H case, it should be noted that the search result listings
that were required to be removed were not illegal nor did the listings
contain defamatory content. 94 Instead, the listings were links to the
95
following: a YouTube video of a satirical photo montage; a newspaper
article that quoted an individual in his former capacity as a Scientology
employee; 96 a newspaper article of an individual's judicial investigation
into political funding mishaps; 97 and a newspaper article referencing an
individual's criminal sentencing hearing. 98 Most of the factual
information in the claims brought against the CNIL and Google dealt with
what the GDPR defines as sensitive data under Article 19, which involves

89. Id. 132.
90. Google I, supra note 14,

¶ 48. This was important because in the previous ruling of

Google v. Spain the GDPR had not been in effect.

91. Id. ¶45.
92. Id. ¶72.
93. See GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17.
94. Google II, supra note 15.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. 26.
Id.127.
Id.¶ 28.
Id. ¶29.
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political opinions, religious beliefs and other general identifying
information.
The important takeaway from this case was the notice and takedown
procedure that was created for sensitive data, which in the realm of
OSINT, can be considered pieces of information that can create a mosaic
of crucial information within the intelligence gathering realm.1 00
Furthermore the Google II case is the expansive interpretation of the
balancing test-privacy rights versus public interests, especially as
applied to sensitive data.101 If the public's interest in the information
outweighs the privacy interest, then it needs to evaluate whether keeping
the link is strictly necessary for preserving the public interest.1 0 2 If the
information is strictly necessary, then the search engine will need to
adjust the list of results in a way that shows an overall picture-for
instance, if the search results only mention an arrest or conviction, but no
charges were ever filed, the criminal conviction was overturned, or the
individual was not found guilty, that information would need to be added
to the list of results.' 03 An example of this in the case would be the claim
brought by B.H. regarding search results displaying articles that he was
questioned in a judicial investigation opened in June 1995, but not
displaying articles mentioning the outcome of the investigation in which
he was discharged and the proceedings were closed.1 0 4
However, what the definition or standards of strictly necessary might
be are not quite clear. Oddly enough, the de-listed information discussed
in this case was mostly public information that a public audience would
want to know (i.e., political campaign violations or criminal trials),
although this could be up for interpretation. Yet, the CJEU believed a
RTBF decision should be based on a case-by-case interpretation where
the bar is set too high for the public's interest. 105
The Facebook case is the most controversial as it dealt with the
removal of Facebook posts and comments made against a former public
official, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek.1 0 6 The Austrian lower court felt the
posts were harmful to Glawischnig-Piesczek's reputation.1 07 Based on the
lower court's ruling, Glawischnig-Piesczek asked Facebook to delete the
posts, but Facebook refused as she was not the individual who published
the comments. 108 The questions posed to the CJEU were threefold: First,
99.

See GDPR, supra note 10, art. 19.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Google II, supra note 15, 1¶ 62-66.
Id. ¶68.
Id. ¶78.
Id.
Id. 128.
Id. ¶ 103-04.

106. Facebook, supra note 16,

¶T 10,

12.

107. Id. ¶¶ 12, 17.
108. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
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did Facebook have a responsibility to remove content it was not aware of
(i.e., through automatic filtering); second, did Facebook have a
responsibility to remove identical or equivalent content posted by any
user; and third, did Facebook have a responsibility to remove the content
on a global scale?' 0 9
11 0 While
-,v" The CJEU answered in the affirmative to all three questions.
this case was not a typical RTBF case compared to Google I and Google
II, regardless, it was important because it expanded the de-listing of
information to social media sites and it applied global injunctions for the
removal of information to the automatic filtering of information."' The
principal outcomes from these three later cases could not only implicate
those crucial puzzle pieces of information obtained from OSINT, but it
would crucially undervalue OSINT.
C. The True Value of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
There is no universal definition of OSINT, however, it is statutorily
defined by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 as
"intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is
collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an
appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence
requirement." 12 One more level of OSINT exists, which is known as
validated OSINT-differing from regular OSINT simply by the mere fact
13
that it has a high degree of validity and certainty attached to it.
4
Historically, OSINT has been around for more than 50 years."
Although it has been around for a while, OSINT has always been placed
in the backburner due to the IC's belief that its main objective is to
5
"discover and steal secrets" and obtain clandestine information."
However, this mindset is flawed. The more technology develops the more
6
it boosts OSINT's credibility and importance." In fact, after World War
I, the Office of Strategic Services-the precursor to the CIA created by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt-had a branch that would collect
newspapers, press clippings or radio broadcasts from around the world to
109.
110.
111.
112.
119 Stat.

Id. 120.
Id.153.
Id.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-63,
3136, 3411 (2006).

§ 931,

113. Heather J. Williams & Ilana Blum, Defining Second Generation Open Source
Intelligence (OSINT) for the Defense Enterprise, RAND CORP. 9 (2018), https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research-reports/RR1964.html [https://perma.cc/MCL6-QSNL].
114. RICHARD A. BEST & ALFRED CUMMING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34270, OPEN SOURCE
INTELLIGENCE (OSINT): ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4-5 (2007), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL

34270.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS8T-TVN5].
115. Id.
116. Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 19.
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gather intelligence.1 17 During the Cold War, the IC would track the
published work of scientists and if they discovered a pause, then it would
signal that the Russians were developing new technologies.118
Some say that OSINT entered a period of dormancy even into the eve
of the 9/11 attacks.1 19 However, after 9/11, counterintelligence experts
began looking at the Internet as a "new frontier" for intelligence
gathering. In 2008, a top national security official, Frances Fragos
Townsend, noted how the internet and other open source methods of
information sharing was the new "battlefield in the war on terror."1 2 0
Some pinpoint the 2009 Iranian "Green Revolution," in which the
citizens of Iran were protesting the government regime in power, as the
catalyst for the revolutionization of OSINT after its many years of
dormancy.121 The internet suddenly became flooded with Iranian
citizen's uploading information related to coordinated political activities,
propaganda, and viral content including the protests taking place in Iran,
all in almost real-time, and it was all uploaded via the internet and social
media.1 2 2 While the protests were unsuccessful, "any individual aroundthe world could mine these social networks for intelligence-grade
content, and in the process, write articles, forecasts and deliver insightful
intelligence analysis."1 23 With the rise of machine learning and the
availability of big data coined Web 3.0, it can be said that OSINT has
moved into a new phase of collection gathering.1 2 4 Even then, social
media has truly been the catalyst for providing a large amount of data and
numerous sources to an OSINT analyst's fingertips.
OSIF is split into four categories: (1) widely available data; (2)
targeted commercial data; (3) individual experts; and (4) "gray" literature
which is made up of writings produced by the private sector, the
government, or academia for which access is limited or its existence is
not widely known.125 Examples of sources that fall into the above
categories include news articles, academic papers or "computer-based
information."1 26 About 80% of OSINT is easily accessible information
meanwhile 9% is "gray" information and 11% is contested.1 2 7 The way
S17. Colquhoun, supra note 4.
118. BEST & CUMMING, supra note 114, at 4, n.15.
119. Id.
120. FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, REMARKS BY THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
HOMELAND SECURITY & COUNTERTERRORISM, ODNI OPEN SOURCE CONFERENCE (July 16, 2007).
121. Colquhoun, supra note 4.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 39.
125. BEST & CUMMING, supra note 114, at 6.
126. Id
127. DANIEL LOMAS & CHRISTOPHER J. MURPHY,
SPIES 24 (2019).
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OSINT is defined is important as it determines how its information will
be evaluated, treated, and prioritized.1 28
Some argue that OSINT is too narrowly defined. 12 9 In fact, they
propose different definitions all together by eliminating validated OSINT
and suggesting to include the term "open-source data," which would be
defined as "material ... of little individual value in isolation but is of
intelligence value in compilation" like tweets on views of ISIS within a
geographic area or mapping a multitude of IP addresses to create a global
picture of internet use in a specific area. 0o Additionally, they consider
open source information as more substantive material that can be lawfully
obtained through request, purchase, or observation by a member of the
public.1 3 1
These proponents also place open source information into two groups:
13 2
institutionally generated content and individually generated content.
Institutional content consists of news media content and gray literature,
meanwhile individual generated content is made up of long-form and
short-form social media content.1 3 3 Long-form content is "text-heavy"
information obtained from blogs and sites like Reddit. 3 4 Meanwhile,
short-form content is information obtained from sites like Facebook or
Twitter. 3 5 OSINT that is focused on short-form content had little value
when observing individual posts on their own; rather, short-form only
becomes truly valuable when it is aggregated.1 36 For instance, short-form
content would become valuable if there are multiple posts from different
users in one area where an incident or event is taking place, all giving
different accounts of what they see from their different angles and points
of view. However, accounts of specific high value interest are the
exception to short-form content.17
As mentioned before, delineating clear definitions are very important.
Until recently, social media was not event considered part of the OSINT
definition. In fact, OSINT grouped computer-based information together
with media sources. It is important to note that open-source data can
include public material that is not explicitly published but is still publicly
38
or commercially available, such as metadata.1

128. Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 7.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.

134. Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 12.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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OSINT's expansive amount of information can be its setback too.
Only a small portion of large quantities of OSINT information can be
utilized and analysts have to sift through a good amount of data.13 9 It can
be logically argued that this dilution of information and the great efforts
it takes to develop OSINT from raw information into actionable
intelligence is a reason why OSINT should not be valued as much as other
more direct intelligence collection activities.
However, OSINT does contain valuable and beneficial information
that can be employed which is why it is important to consider the
collection efforts as there is no "clear methodology." 14 0 Williams & Blum
note that there should be four key steps: collection, processing,
exploitation, and production.141 These processes assist in understanding
how to effectively acquire, validate, identify the value, and provide the
information.1 4 2 An important process to consider is the validation of
OSINT, especially as it is applied to information acquired from social
media.1 43

It is no surprise that OSINT has become a valuable commodity to
intelligence efforts. As Townsend mentioned in her 2008 speech, "much
of what is known about our enemies is derived from their own statements,
blogs, videos, and chat sessions on the Internet."144 She notes that the
"enemy hides in plain sight."14 Continuing, she stated "They live and
work amongst us, waiting patiently as operational attack plans are
developed." 46 OSINT can be a "goldmine of data on public opinion,
social networks and interactions, identity and cultural values."1 47 In fact,
80% of mission critical information is publicly available.1 4 8 This can be
attributed to the fact that there were one billion Internet websites and
users in 2008 and 2014 respectively.1 49

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.

143. See id at 16-17 (explaining that validation is part of processing, which is important for
OSINT since it has an "abundance of available information in a less-structured format").
144. Frances Fragos Townsend, Remarks by the Assistant to the President for the Homeland
Security & Counterterrorism, ODNI Open Source Conference (July 16, 2007),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20070716_sp

eech_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3 H4-NFKT].
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Luke Sloan et al., Who Tweets? Deriving the Demographic Characteristics of Age,

Occupation and Social Class from Twitter User Meta-Data, PLOs ONE (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/joumal.pone.0115545#sec00I
[https://perma
cc/VS3T-8LWP].
148. Charania, supra note 2, at 94.

149. Id.
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The prevalence of social media has made the Internet an environment
rich for intelligence collection. Methods used to collect information from
social media have focused on lexical analysis, social media analysis, and
geospatial analysis. 5 0 Lexical analysis shows the most searched-for
terms on Google or finds the keywords that have frequently appeared in
Internet searches."' This type of analysis can also "parse meaning behind
language and infer information about the people engaging in social
media, including demographic characteristics such as age, social class,
economic background and education level."1 5 2
In social media analysis, the purpose is to analyze the large network
of actors rather than the actual individual posting or interacting with the
site.'5 3 Therefore, nodes are utilized to describe individuals outside or
inside of a network that help to describe the composition of these
networks. 5 4 Piecing together these nodes allows us to frame together
how they interact with each other, what nodes hold more control or power
and how they are linked through each other through shared
connections.' 55 An example of social network analysis is the way that it
can help track violent extremist ideology online.' 5 Analysts are able to
track influencers like ISIS and the way they use social media to propagate
language and ideology, while also identifying individuals that may watch
an individual YouTube video or read a tweet from followers sharing the
same ideology. 5 7
Lastly, geospatial analysis consists of geotagging, geolocating, geoinference, and georeferencing.158 However, geotagging is probably the
most commonly used and known of the four, as this feature is
automatically enabled on all cellphones and social media applications and
users must be consciously aware to turn such features off if not wanted.159
Hence, this is why it is known as "volunteered geography" because of its
easy accessibility and common use by users. 16 0 An example of this feature
would be the case of the New Zealander Mark Taylor who went to Syria
to fight for ISIS and posted approximately 45 tweets with the geotagging
feature enabled, which revealed his location, down to the specific house
he was residing in, near an ISIS stronghold.161 Interestingly enough, he
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 23-32.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 27-28.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31-33.
Id. at 31.
Id.

161. Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 32.
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attempted to delete, on his own, the 45 geotagged tweets in an attempt to
hide where he was located.1 62 The most common theme among geospatial
analysis is that data obtained from publicly-available information allows
certain important targets like geographical markers, specific locations, or
even individuals to be located.
The prevalence of social media has proven beneficial to intelligence
efforts, while also presenting some challenges. Social media has allowed
for easier posting of information for terrorist organizations and its "fanboys," provides insight on broader goals of terrorist organizations, and
gauges public opinion.1 63 The proliferation and accessibility of data made
available by social media is not unknown to terrorist organizations,
however, it is impossible for them to control everything their members
do on the Internet.' 1 Even with their attempt to control social media
activity, many of their members still enable features that allow for their
groups to be easily located.1 65 But its prevalence has also introduced more
noise among valuable information; disinformation; and deception. 166
However, as we will discuss later these factors do not completely devalue
the importance and existence of OSINT.
There are three schools of thought surrounding the value of OSINTthose that consider clandestine work as more valuable than OSINT, those
that find OSINT valuable and supplemental to clandestine work, and
those that are in the middle who do not consider OSINT as the "smoking
gun" for certain issues or threats but could help in other ways.1 6 7
Regardless of the school of thought that one may relate to, OSINT is
revolutionizing intelligence gathering efforts in its own independent
capacity. "OSINT is often underutilized by the IC because of the
difficultly in understanding emerging OSINT sources and methods,
particularly social media platforms."1 68 And while OSINT does provide
for an increased amount of data to sift through, advocates of OSINT still
propose that its cost is much lower than regular clandestine efforts.1 69
Regardless of the opinions had about OSINT, geographically, it is
becoming a key part of intelligence efforts in Canada, the European
Union (EU), Asia, and lesser developed countries like Latin America,

162. Denver Nicks, New Zealander ISIS FighterAccidentally Tweets Secret Location, TIME
(Jan. 1, 2015, 11:08 AM), https://time.com/3651559/new-zealand-isis-twitter/ [https://perma.cc
/34RR-H2MH].
163. Charania, supra note 2, at 95-97.
164. Id. at 95.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 98.
167. BEST & CUMMING, supra note 114, at 2-3.
168. Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 3.

169. Stephen Arnold, The Other Intelligent Open Source, 195 INFO.
2003).
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Africa, and Central Asia.1 70 In the EU, Europol and INTCEN have
boosted their OSINT operations by budgeting E2.OM on establishing
permanent monitoring and reporting of open source information and
developing an EC3 platform.' 7 1 In 2016, OSINT investments were
calculated as 30% for the Asia-Pacific region; 29% for North America;
23% for Europe; 11% for the Middle East and Africa; and 7% for Latin
America. 17 2 It is forecasted that by 2022 Asia-Pacific will continue to
invest the most in OSINT at 32% compared to North America at 27%.173
The U.S. is making strides towards investing in OSINT. As a result of
the Intelligence and Reform Terrorism Act, the National Open Source
Center was created in 2005 within the Office of Director of National
Intelligence. 174 In 2015, it was renamed into the Open Source Enterprise
and moved to the Central Intelligence Agency as part of the Directorate
of Digital Innovation.1 75 The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA) has advocated that classified sources should supplement public
information from open sources. 17 6 The Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) has been working on recruiting and hiring data scientists that
would focus on OSINT work and the Department of Defense (DOD)
established the Defense Open Source Council to support DOD's OSINT
initiatives.1 77 OSINT will soon be revolutionized by machine learning
and automated reasoning.1 78 This type of technology will assist in sifting
through the extensive amount of data and simplify social media analysis.
OSINT specifically relies on public information taken from websites
and search engines, as well as "gray" resources that are not as easily
accessible, but public, nonetheless. This can be in the form of metadata
and data points populated from social media activities. If the RTBF will
be increasingly utilized, especially by social media users, it is possible

170. Id.
171. Europol, Europol Programming Document 2019-2021, 42, 59, https://www.europol.

europa.eu/publications-documents/europol-programming-document
ZUEX] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).

[https://perma.cc/JUA3-

172. Homeland Security Research Corp. (HSRC) Publishes "OSINT Market & Technologies
- 2019-2022 Market Report," CISION PR NEWSWIRE (June 27, 2019), https://www.pmewswire.
com/news-releases/homeland-security-research-corp-hsrc-publishes-osint-market-echnologies

-- 2019-2022-market-report-300875282.html [https://perma.cc/PH2N-WP65] (follow the "OpenSource Intelligence Global Market 2019-2022" hyperlink in the first sentence; then scroll down
past the "Why Choose Us?" box to the tabbed list reading "Description, Table of Contents, Tables
& Figures, More Info"; Under the "Description" tab, scroll down to table labeled "Global OpenSource Intelligence Market Share [%] by Region 2016 & 2022").
173. Id
174. BEST & CUMMING, supra note 114, at 11-12.
175. Id.
176. Williams & Blum, supra note 113, at 37.

177. Id. at 39.
178. Id
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that targets of OSINT may want to remove themselves or traces of their
activities that might assist in intelligence gathering efforts.
D. The Intersectionof RTBF and OSINT
As we have seen from the RTBF case law, the conversation centers
around removing public information contained in search engine results,
webpages or social media posts. This information is the building blocks
of OSINT. The thesis of this Article assumes that first, the requesters are
aware of the RTBF process and are knowledgeable of how to request this
process. The second assumption is that the RTBF process is not a lengthy
one. If the opposite were true, then taking advantage of such process
would not be as beneficial to those requesters that are avoiding OSINT
sweeps. The third is that there is no trust deficit among groups or
individuals that would be subjects of interest for OSINT sweeps. Without
trust deficits, there is a higher reliance on technology by these parties. 179
The claims proposed above are more than plausible. Potential targets,
especially terrorist organizations are very knowledgeable and involved in
social media culture. In 2015, there was almost 18,000 accounts related
to ISIS and similar groups including Al Qaeda use "bots" to broadcast
their cause.1 80 ISIS and its supporters also utilize encrypted platforms like
Telegram to communicate with each other.181
The RTBF precedent promotes a swift process from the time a request
is made to an electronic communication service provider and de-list or
de-referencing occurs. In 2015, after the Google v. Spain decision,
Google received more than 254,000 removal requests from countries
across Europe. 8 2 The requests came from the following top four
countries: U.K., Germany, France, and the Netherlands.1 83 Seventy
percent of RTBF requests were being denied by Google.1 84 The timing it
took for Google to process these requests was about 16 days. 8 5 Between
May 2014 and February 2018, it received over 2.4 million requests, but
only 43% have been approved.1 86
179. See Zeeshan-Ul-Hassan Usmani, Predictive Modeling to Counter TerroristAttacks, 20
BROWN J. OF WORLD AFFS. 277, 281 (2014) (explaining that terrorist organizations do correlate
data with each other, especially attacks).
180. Charania, supra note 2, at 98.

181. Id
182. Greg Sterling, Google Offers Insight Into Its Right-to-be-Forgotten Review Process,
LAND (May 13, 2015, 4:54 PM), https://marketingland.com/we-vote-google-offersinsight-into-its-right-to-be-forgotten-review-process-128686 [https://perma.cc/X2P5-KK36].

MKTG.

183. Id.
184. Id
185. Id
186. Paul Sawers, Google Has Received 2.4 Million 'Right to be Forgotten' URL Delisting
Requests and Fulfilled 43%, VENTURE BEAT (Feb. 27, 2018, 2:27 AM), https://venturebeat.com
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The fact that the GDPR has only been in effect for five years could
signal a continued increase in these requests. It is also well-known that
87
terrorist organizations do speak and work with each other.' There is no
trust deficit between terrorist groups. 188 The fact that there is a lack of
coordination between agencies within the same country or
extraterritorially could be the reasons why groups may be one
89
coordinated attack ahead of counterterrorism efforts.1 These explained
assumptions only prove that our discussion about OSINT and the
unintended consequence of the RTBF is not far-fetched.
With its extraterritorial application, almost all technology companies
would be subject to GDPR regulation, so long as they process the data of
an EU resident. For example, on Twitter's website, it explains how they
are considered data controllers in some situations, but data processors in
others.' 9 0 The GDPR broadly defines data, therefore, it would be
neglectful to believe that only web searches, as the ones discussed in the
Google cases, would apply to the RTBF. In fact, some agree that the
RTBF's reach will expand to other types of crucial data, such as "the
metadata, conversations and media shared in direct messages between
users, device tokens, email and phone number contact lists, IP address
audits, and [] inferred data like user, age, gender, languages spoken, and
interests." 19 1 The fact that most of this information is available through
host sites1 9 2 or social media applications like Twitter and Facebook-is
even more troubling, considering that in the Facebook case the CJEU
93
determined that Facebook was a data controller under the GDPR.1 It
also obligated these sites to remove posts and comments that were not
94
only identical, but of "equivalent content" that is deemed illegal.1 These
95
actions would apply globally through automatic filters.'
This precedent is extremely expansive. Scholars argue that the RTBF
precedent has created "an unprecedented imbalance in the Internet
ecosystem in favor of data subjects' erasure requests" over those of the

.

/2018/02/27/google-has-received-2-4-mill ion-right-to-be-forgotten-url-delisting-requests-andfulfilled-43 [https://perma.cc/C4QE-2K9N]
187. Usmani, supra note 179, at 280-81.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Twitter for

Business

FAQ

3,

TWiTTER,

https://gdpr.twitter.com/en/faq.html

[https://perma.cc/ED7K-LFT9] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
191. Johnson, supra note 21.

192. Host sites are defined as online service providers that "store content uploaded by users,
typically making it accessible to other people online." Keller, supra note 48, at 322-23.
193. Keller, supra note 48, at 323 (citing CG v. Facebook IrelandLtd [2016] NICA 54, ¶¶
88, 91 (Nor. Ir.), http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NICA/2016/54.html).
194. Facebook, supra note 16, ¶T 45-46.

195. Id.
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data controllers.' 96 Not only has RTBF placed an obligation on online
internet and social media platforms (technology platforms) to determine
answers to legal questions that could vary from country to country, but
this imbalance has been fueled by huge fines, bad press or damaged
relationships with DPA's. Most arguments center on the fact that it could
prove negatively for freedom of expression, but the same could be said
for intelligence efforts. Ultimately, this will lead to technology platforms
"honor[ing] not only legitimate RTBF requests but also mistaken or.
abusive ones." 19 7 It has also been proven that platforms "comply with
legally baseless requests all too often."1 98
Google has already received requests from individuals asking to
remove information related to public officials, priests and professionals
attempting to hide criminal and unsavory acts. 199 Additionally, 90% of
the requests received consists of delisting personal information. 20 0 One
request from an individual sought to delist one URL on the website of a
government department, which included information on the individual's
affiliations with a terrorist organization. 20 1 Luckily, Google did not delist
the URL. 2 02 Delisting or removing any information from search results is
not an inconsequential issue but removing information from host sites can
be much more harmful. 2 03 The information is removed from the Internet
completely and the author's only copy would be eliminated. 204 While this
could prove detrimental for author expression, it is much more
unfavorable for OSINT efforts that rely on the now-deleted
information. 2 05
We have seen how OSINT proves beneficial for intelligence
gathering. It allows us to analyze terrorism recruitment efforts, locations,
and behaviors. However, there are some concerning attributes. With so
many privacy features or encryption applications, can we effectively
track online activity? Terrorist groups are more than aware of their digital
footprint and attempt to be as careful as possible. Also, while most of us
strive to place as many privacy settings on our data, not everything on the

196. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Fourth Year of Forgetting: The Troubling Expansion of the

Right to be Forgotten, 39 U. Pa. J. INT'L L. 1011, 1056 (2018).
197. Keller, supra note 48, at 291.

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Requests

to

Delist

Content

Under

European

Privacy Law,

GOOGLE,

https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview [https://perma.cc/6JTA-9ZU3] (last

visited Nov. 3, 2020).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Keller, supra note 48, at 325.

204. Id.
205. Id.
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internet is private. To err is to be human, but it is OSINT's job to
monopolize on those errors and "privacy loopholes."
One major issue is whether the information obtained is reliable or not.
On the internet, anyone can pose as anyone or post anything without
credibility. Some argue that having to continue confirming reliability of
OSINT is costly and timely, but even with clandestine information, there
is always a level of authentication that is required. Falsification and
disinformation do not discontinue OSINT's value and instead, it is
RTBF's rising precedent that could play a part in minimizing and
devaluing its worth. Factors like falsification and expansive data are
issues that have solutions. Terrorist groups will always be on the internet,
especially for recruitment purposes, therefore, they will co-exist in the
virtual world leaving some footprints or evidence behind. Meanwhile,
mining through troves of data will be possible through better and more
developed OSINT technology, especially machine learning capability
software. However, removing data is consequential and irreplaceable.
Once the evidence is destroyed, it is no longer accessible.
II. SOLUTIONS
OSINT, for purposes of national security, is valuable and important,
but protecting the privacy and civil liberties of individuals is just as
crucial. While the majority of information that would be implicated by
this Article's discussion centers around foreign targets, specifically those
residing in the EU or communicating with individuals in the EU, it is
prudent to point out that there is always the highest probability that the
information of U.S. persons-a citizen or permanent resident-may be
implicated. This scenario is most probable when it comes to acquiring
social media information. The IC must be mindful of this implication and
it must always ask itself the following questions: What is the information
obtained? How will the information be utilized? What proper laws could
be applicable to the use of the information? Executive Order 12333 does
outline the procedures that must be followed to collect and retain the
information of U.S. persons.
When it comes to EU persons, the GDPR serves to protect and
preserve the individual privacy of its individuals. The RTBF model is an
outgrowth of the importance by EU law to create choices for individuals
by allowing them to decide what level of privacy they deem important.
When an individual submits an RTBF request, they are choosing to
exercise a level of privacy on their information. It is unimaginable to
argue that privacy is not an important right that must be preserved.
Instead, this Article seeks to argue that privacy should be understood and
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defined from a pluralistic perspective. 206 By understanding privacy from
this approach, you can attempt to analyze the specific issues of privacy
that evolve around specific sets of problems. 2 07
The concept of privacy should not be antiquated nor disregarded.
Instead, it should be upgraded. It should be regarded as consisting of more
than just one single concept. In the surveillance context, I propose that
we think about privacy in the context of digital privacy versus individual
self-privacy. What you are able to allow to "commodize" about yourself
(i.e. what is allowable by you to make publicly available by self-control)
is your digital privacy. Your individual self-privacy is what occurs in the
kinetic world that you understand to be subject to an absolute form of
privacy. Former ODNI General Counsel, Robert S. Litt stated in his
speech:
Why is it that people are willing to expose large quantities
of information to private parties but don't want the
Government to have the same information? Why, for
example, don't we care if the telephone company keeps
records of all of our phone calls on its servers, but we feel
very differently about the prospect of the same information
being on NSA servers? This does not seem to me to be a
difficult question: we care because of what the Government
could do with the information. 208
In fact, I believe that in the privacy context, we are more worried with
who has our data than what it is done with it.2 o Therefore, the privacy
issue should rest more on self-control of the individual than of a blanket
dismissal of government practices. But, to live up to this privacy model,
it is also up to the government to foster and build up that trust.
This leads to the distrust. The RTBF precedent is a logical outgrowth
of an insecurity shared by citizens that was created- by the actions of
governments and technology companies. Oddly enough, the RTBF legal
model rests much of the decision power to technology platform's, who
determine the extent of what content to remove and why. It is up to
206. Daniel J. Solove, 've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other Misunderstandingsof Privacy,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 745, 756 (2007).

207. Id.
208. Robert S. Litt, Privacy, Technology, and NationalSecurity: An Overview of Intelligence
Collection, OFF. DIR. NAT. INTEL. (Nov. 21, 2020, 9:46 PM), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/speeches-interviews/speeches-interviews-2013/item/896-privacy-technology-andnational-security-an-overview-of-intelligence-collection-by-robert-s- itt-odni-general-counsel#:
~:text=Why%20is%20it%20that%20people,to%20have%20the%20same%20information%3F&

text-entirely%20understandable%20concern%20that%20the%20Government%20may%20abus
e%20this%20power [https://perma cc/FFP7-7SYN].
209. See Steven C. Bennett, The "Right to be Forgotten": Reconciling EU and US

Perspectives, 30

BERKELEY

J. INT'L L. 161, 165 (2012) (explaining suggestions for ways to

approach this area by looking at "source of the content" rather than where the content is shared).
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governments to reinstate confidence in their intelligence efforts and
privacy responsibilities.
To ease the consequences of RTBF, there must be compromise. To
achieve this compromise, the U.S. could enter into data agreements with
EU member states, similar to the U.S. and U.K. agreement that resulted
from the CLOUD Act passed by Congress in 2019.210 By entering into
agreements, it could assist with bridging the differences in law, especially
with regard to privacy. 21 ' If no agreement is entered into, then the U.S.
cannot acquire, process or retain the data of any foreign target from that
EU member state. 2 12 As illustrated by David Luban, et al., the result "of
an interconnected world . . . is a clear trend towards . .. convergence
among the various legal systems around the world" and therefore
"traditions are eroding." 2 13 Therefore, new approaches need to be
considered, especially with our advanced state of technology within
society.
In the Facebook case, the CJEU emphasized the disparity in member
states' legislation and case law "concerning liability of service providers
acting as intermediaries [which] prevent the smooth functioning of the
internal market . . . by impairing the development of cross-border
services. ... "214 If that is so, then the CJEU would likely agree that
agreements like this would provide an ample solution to prevent further
disparities by addressing how these providers should treat the data of
individuals.
The CLOUD Act stemmed from an inconsistency in U.S. law
regarding the extraterritoriality of the Electronic Communications
Provider Act, which regulated data transfers of technology companies
2 15 Currently, countries can
and their cooperation with law enforcement.
request information needed for law enforcement investigations through
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process, which can be a
long, arduous, frustrating procedure. 2 16 MLAT is rooted in international
law, which allows for the creation of "bilateral and regional treaties
governing both U.S. law enforcement's acquisition of user data from
foreign jurisdictions and vice-versa." 21 7 It would set expectations on
evidence gathering, law enforcement behaviors, and any other treaty2 18
related cooperation activity.
210. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, P.L. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 [CLOUD Act].
211. Id. at 193.
212. Brehmer, supra note 31, at 937.
213.

2018).
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

DAVID LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135

(3d

ed.

Facebook, supra note 16, at 1 40.
Brehmer, supra note 31, at 934, 940, 954.
Id. at 950-51.
Id at 950.
Id at 950-51.
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However, these MLATs can take many years to be finalized and not
all participating states have a fully-staffed or existing Central Authority
that could assist in the creation of these agreements. By the time an
agreement is finalized, it is too late to obtain important evidence. Enter
the CLOUD Act, which sets aside the legal barriers to allow access to
electronic data from other countries for purposes of criminal
investigations.2 1 9 Ultimately, it allows the executive branch to enter into
agreements, which "determine which countries qualify based on several
factors, including whether the foreign country has entered into an
appropriate executive agreement, and whether the foreign country
'affords robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and
"..
'220
civil liberties in light of the data collection .
In Google I, the CJEU left open the possibility for EU member states
to
consider whether they would apply RTBF provisions
extraterritorially. 22 1 With this precedent, it would not be unusual for
member states to enter into agreements that would assist U.S. intelligence
efforts while still incorporating civil liberty protections and privacy rights
for EU persons. In other CJEU case law, the U.S. has already conceded
to greater data transfer restrictions than its EU counterparts such as in the
Max Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner case and other reported
comparisons. 2 2 2 The U.S. has displayed a willingness to come to the table
and agree on these important issues and concede on areas when
necessary. Although it would not be fair for the U.S. to be treated
similarly as other EU counterparts, especially when it comes to its own
laws and regulations on intelligence.
The GDPR allows its member states to exercise derogations in certain
sections. 223 As a result of these derogations, data controllers and
processors must consider member states' own national laws, in addition
to other provisions of the GDPR and CJEU case law.2 2 4 As it stands, the
U.K. has derogated from Article 17 RTBF provisions by being one of the
first countries to establish an agreement with the U.S. under the CLOUD
Act model. 225 This proves that countries are willing to come to a
consensus under a bilateral agreement, and those bilateral agreements
219.

US. and U.K. Agreement, supra note 23.

220. U.S. Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Outlook, GIBsoN DUNN (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/us-cybersecurity-and-data-privacy-outlook-and-review-2019/

[https://perma.cc/Q4LG-5KBE].
221. Google 1, supra note 14, ¶ 72.
222. Brehmer, supra note 31, at 958; See also Christopher Wolf & Winston Maxwell, Why
the U.S. is Held to a Higher Data Protection Standard, IAPP (May 2, 2015), https://iapp.org/
news/a/why-the-u-s-is-held-to-a-higher-data-protection-standard-than-france/
[https://perma.cc/

DCG2-DWNL].
223. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 49.
224. GDPR, supra note 10, arts. 85, 89.
225. U.S. and U.K. Agreement, supra note 23.
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could be a solution to addressing the differences in how privacy is
perceived among the various countries. This particular solution could
also help define what truly is a national security exemption. There should
be no reason that this bilateral agreement solution would contradict the
GDPR seeing as Recital 16 of the GDPR allows for member states to
226
execute actions for national security interests separate from the GDPR.
It is imperative that "national security" be both exercisable and
227 By agreeing on a
properly defined under Article 23 of the GDPR.
proper definition, it would allow for EU member states to work with the
U.S. to derogate from aspects of the GDPR, especially RTBF, during the
processing of OSINT information of EU persons for national security
issues.
The Working Party attempted to dissect the issues surrounding the
national security exemption and found concerns regarding U.S.
surveillance. I discussed above how the national security exemption is
comprised of three situational contexts that would need to be
addressed. 228 By properly establishing an agreed upon definition,
whether to be applicable across the entire EU or with each member state,
it would allow for the proper derogation without the negative stigma
surrounding U.S. surveillance. While case law is scarce on this issue, the
definition could consider factors such as the individual involved and their
location or citizenship status; requiring a set of articulable facts similar
to the Fourth Amendment search warrant model; and setting a mandatory
time limit of data processing and retention of 30 days with a follow-up
review by the proposed oversight committee.
The oversight mechanism of RTBF is not balanced, especially for
certain types of technology. 229 The GDPR created the DPA role, which
is appointed by each EU member state. 2 30 The role was created through
232 All DPA's
Directive 95/46/EC 23 1 and strengthened by the GDPR.
consist of independent organizations, who have a number of
2 33
Their main
responsibilities as dictated under Article 57 of the GDPR.
persons
natural
of
purpose is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms
with relations to data processing and the facilitation of the free flow of
data. 234
Although the DPA role requires impartiality as directed by Article 52
226. Recital 16, supra note 75.
227. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 23.

228. See Part I. B.
229. See Keller, supra note 48, at 318, 338 (discussing the framework of RTBF claims as it
applies to host sites).
230. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 51.

231. Hoofnagle, supra note 34, at 94.
232. Keller, supra note 48, at 316-17.
233. GDPR, supra note 10, art. 57;
234. Keller, supra note 48, at 357.

Hoofnagle,
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of the GDPR, some have observed that the DPA model has lacked
"adequate independence." 23 5 As Keller argues, DPA's have an interest in
making sure that host sites are obligated under RTBF to increase their
effective authority. 2 3 6 The review of RTBF requests are also swayed in
favor of privacy. 2 37 This is due to the lack of public review of DPA
decisions. 23 8 If there is a disagreement between the DPA and the
technology platforms, there is no intermediary to assist with the
disagreement other than the CJEU.
While the DPA model was created to monitor data controllers and
processors, it would be much more helpful to create a separate and
independent data monitoring committee, similar to the composition of
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) and the similar
objectives of the Interpol. The GIFCT was created by a group of
technology companies who wanted to share best practices on addressing
terrorism abuse on their platforms. 2 3 9 Recently, they announced that they
would be transforming GIFCT into an independent body with its own
Executive Director. 2 4 0
The overall goal of GIFCT was to provide a space for sharing of
knowledge on this one narrow issue of terrorism, while also providing
incident protocol and joint technology innovation. 2 4 1 With my proposed
committee, the primary focus would be somewhat similar to GIFCT. It
would be a space to create information-sharing protocols that would
adhere and address all EU member states' concerns. This committee
would serve as a neutral organization that would assist with managing
data transfers.
The Interpol model provides the same level of information-sharing.
Instead, the Interpol works with countries and serves as a sounding board
for transnational criminal law. This proposed committee would be
comprised of experts in the national security and privacy field that would
be privy to sensitive, classified information. This committee could also
serve as the Central Authority for the bilateral agreements discussed
above. The current Data Protection Board is charged with enacting policy
and best practices as it relates to the entire GDPR. However, the proposed
235. Hoofnagle, supra note 34, at 94.
236. Keller, supra note 48, at 338.
237. See Id. at 321 (determining that there are incentives for online service providers to err

on the side of the data subject's rights for fear of facing large fines from the GDPR).
238. Id. at 356; See Nunziato, supra note 196, at 1044 (noting the lack of notice and
opportunity to be heard for whom erasure is directed at from the RTBF provision).
239. GLOB. INTERNET F. TO COUNTER TERRORISM, https://gifct.org/about/ [https://perma.cc

/8TRY-4GEU] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
240. Progress for the Independent GIFCT, GLOB. INTERNET F. TO COUNTER TERRORISM
(Dec.
KV94].

I1,

241.

2019),

https://gifct.org/press/progress-independent-gifct/
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committee would focus on the intricate and nuanced process of data
transfers and information sharing for purposes of national security issues.
CONCLUSION

When the ECJ ruled in favor of erasure in Google v. Spain, it was not
apparent how this one decision would start a series of other actions and
decisions that would promote unintended consequences in the area of
data and intelligence gathering. While the GDPR has only been in effect
for a few years, it seems that it is here to stay. Therefore, with a focus on
cooperation and a different approach to privacy enforcement, there can
be some medium that could appease both sides of the debate. In the five
years that RTBF has been in existence, countries outside of the EU like
Colombia, Japan, Mexico, and Russia have been recognizing and
incorporating the RTBF model. 242 In fact, most adopted laws within
2 43
With the globalization of
months of the Google v. Spain decision.
RTBF, it is imperative that we continue to have productive discussions
on this topic.

242. Nunziato, supra note 196, at 1059-63.

243. Id.
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